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Capital requirements for banks are of foremost importance for financial stability in the sense that they
are intended to minimise the probability of bank failure at reasonable cost. In fact, past episodes of
widespread bank insolvency turned out to be very costly in terms of taxpayers’ money and highly dis-
ruptive to the real economy reflected, for example, in output losses and steep rises in unemployment.
The role of capital requirements worksat least in twoways:it provides a loss absorbingcushion for un-
expectedevents and,if properlydesigned,introducesincentivesfor banksto limittheriskof theiractiv-
ities. Given that capital is the most expensive source of banks’ funding, capital requirements have an
impact on the return on equity while potentially influencing the competitive stance in the financial sec-
tor. Against this background and given growing international capital mobility, global harmonization of
prudentialsupervision, ensuring a level playingfield among banks in different countries, is crucial. The
1988 Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988)) was the beginning of the con-
vergence of the rather different approaches that countries adopted. In June 2004 a revision of this
framework, commonly denominated Basel II, was published by the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision(2006b)). These newrules werethen laid downin
EUlegislationandsubsequentlytransposedintoPortuguesenationallaw,comingintoforcein2007.
1
Basel II is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars. Pillar I presents capital requirements for credit,
market and operational risk, introducing the main innovations of this revision. One of them concerns
the use of credit ratings (either internal or external) for the assessment of capital requirements, which
becomesensitiveto the credit qualityof eachspecificexposure,not relyingsolelyon credit type.In this
sense, capital requirements became dependent on the quality of credit, inferred from estimates of risk
drivers such as the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD). Additionally, the vol-
ume of corporate sales and the maturity of credit may also be relevant for evaluating capital require-
ments. Anotherimportantinnovationof BaselII isthat banksarerequiredto holdcapitalfor operational
risk. PillarII concernsthe supervisionof banks.Bankingsupervisorsare givenmore authorityto evalu-
ate the consistencyand robustness of banks’internal risk assessment methodologies. Finally, Pillar III
introduces rules on the information banks are required to publish. This pillar is also called the market
discipline pillar.
The relation between capital requirements and credit quality established under Basel II is believed to
haveaneconomicpro-cyclicaleffect.
2 The ideaisthatwhentheeconomyisonthedownsideofthecy-
clecreditrisk measurestendto increase,resultinginhighercapitalrequirements. As it tendsto bediffi-
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(1) Given that the adoption of the new framework was optional in 2007, it was implemented by the majority of the Portuguese banks only in 2008.
(2) Benford and Nier (2007), Heid (2007) and Kashyap and Stein (2004), among many others, discuss the cyclicality impacts of Basel II using quite different
approaches.cult to raise capital in downturns, banks may be forced to reduce their lending activities, thus
exacerbating shocks in the real economy. There may also be other negative shocks reflected in their
capital base. In this context, an assessment of capital requirements for the European banking system
is of extreme importance, as European firms rely heavily on bank financing. In Portugal, in December
2007,corporateloansrepresentedmore than80percent of total corporatedebt, definedbythe sum of
bank loans granted to and bonds issued by the corporate sector. The importance of banks as a source
of financing is even higher if commercial paper in banks’portfolios is also taken into account alongside
loans granted, as the sum of these two financial instruments held by banks represents more than 85
per cent of total corporate debt.
In this study, an assessment is made of the impact of Basel II rules on capital requirements driven by
credit risk. Intervals of variation for the above mentioned risk drivers are established such that capital
requirements for firms’credit risk under Basel II exceed capital requirements under Basel I. Moreover,
for the Portuguese banking system in 2007 we conclude that, if the observed default rate is used as a
proxy for the probability of default, under Basel II capital requirements for exposures larger than one
million euros to small and medium sized firms are generally higher than the ones assessed under
Basel I. Capital requirements for exposures to large firms are similar to those for exposures smaller
than one million euros to small and medium firms, being these classes the ones that exhibit the small-
est capital requirements. For the Portuguese banking system, capital requirements being higher or
lower than what is stipulated under Basel I is highly dependent on the assumed loss given default. In
particular, using estimates of the loss given default in previous studies of Portuguese banks (always
smaller than 52 per cent) capital requirements for credit risk of non-financial firms are in general less
than what is required under Basel I. Nevertheless, results should be interpreted with caution because
the sample used is biased towards borrowers with better credit risk assessment, due to the lack of
information on a subset of borrowers with higher than average credit risk.
This study, whichis restricted to the analysis of credit risk of non-financial firms, does not look at credit
risk associated with other loans, at market risk and at operational risk. Capital requirements are ex-
pected to decrease if credit risk associated with other loans is considered, as the majority of these
other loans are mortgage loans which traditionally have lower values for the probability of default and
loss given default. However, capital requirements would be higher if operational risk is considered as,
accordingto Banco de Portugal (2008), in June 2008, the capital charge for operationalrisk accounted
for 7 per cent of overall capital requirements. Nevertheless, the overall analysis is representative as
loanstonon-financialfirmsrepresentabout45percentoftotalloansgrantedtonon-financialfirmsand
households and considers the risk component with higher relevance in capital requirements.
The conclusions of this study are in line withstudies carried out in other countries, despite the fact that
ourdatacapturestherecentdeclineinthefirms’financialstanding.Usinginformationfor Spanishfirms
along the period 1994-2001, Saurina and Trucharte (2004) conclude that capital requirements driven
by firms’ credit risk would be 7.27 per cent, versus 8 per cent under Basel I. Fabi, Laviola, and Reedtz
(2005)usedataonItalianfirms for 2002,andconcludethat overallcapitalrequirements for firms’credit
risk would be equal to 5.8 per cent. The Results of the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study (Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (2006a)), undertaken between October and December 2005 by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision on 31 countries,
3 show that required capital for credit risk under
Basel II would decrease relative to the Basel I Accord. Although the portfolio of credits to firms implies
a decrease in required capital, the main driver of this result is the mortgage portfolio, which is not
analysed here.
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(3) The Fifth Quantitative Impact Study was performed on all G10 countries, except the US, and other countries including Portugal.This workis organized as follows.In Section 2, a description of capital requirements for corporate sec-
tor credit risk is presented and compared withthe situation under Basel I. In Section 3, using data from
thePortuguesebankingsystem,acharacterizationoftheloanstofirmsandtheirratesofdefaultispre-
sented.InSection4,anevaluationofcapitalrequirementsforthePortuguesebankingsystemisgiven.
Finally, Section 5 presents the main conclusions.
2. CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CREDIT RISK
This sectiondiscussesthe BaselII frameworkinrespectto capitalrequirements for creditrisk innon-fi-
nancial firms. It starts by briefly recalling the fundamentals of the Basel II Accord and provides a gen-
eral overview of the computation of capital requirements for credit risk. The second part of this section
presents a comparisonof capital requirements underBaselI andBaselII for firms’credit risk as a func-
tion of the risk components underlying the Basel II setting. A more detailed analysis can be found in
Antão and Lacerda (2009).
2.1. Overview of capital requirements within the Basel II framework
The final version of the Basel II Accord, dated June 2004, is the result of a long process characterized
by an intense dialogue between the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, called here the Com-
mittee, the banking industry and national regulators. The Committee released several proposals for
consultation and also conducted several quantitative impact studies on its proposals, aimed at mea-
suring the impact of the new rules. The final version of the text came out of this dialogue with
considerable improvements.
The Basel II Accord retains key elements of the Basel I Accord, among them the basic structure of the
1996 Market Risk Amendment regarding the treatment of market risk (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision(1996)), the definitionof eligiblecapital andthe generalrequirementfor banksto holdtotal
capital equivalentto at least 8 per cent of their total risk-weightedassets. Hence, under Basel II, as un-
der BaselI, the eligiblecapital needsto be equalto or more than 8 per cent of the risk-weightedassets,
i.e., it follows the rule
Eligible Capital
Total Risk Weighted Assets
8%. 
While the definition of eligible capital was almost kept unchanged from Basel I to Basel II, the calcula-
tionof thetotalrisk-weightedassets hasbeensignificantlychanged.The totalrisk-weightedassets are
the sum of the risk-weighted assets for credit risk and a 12.5 multiple of the capital requirements for
market risk and operational risk.
4 As far as credit risk is concerned, the risk-weighted assets are com-
puted by applying a weight to each exposure. This weight is the value of a function provided by the
Committee (hereafter denoted risk weight function), where the inputs of this function are the risk driv-
ers of each exposure. The weight dependence on the risk drivers is a major difference to the previous
regulation as, under Basel I, the weights to be applied were set for very broad categories of credit risk.
The weights used were 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 per cent. As an illustration, corporate credit used to be
weighted at 100 per cent for all exposures, a situation that was widelyrecognized as not reflecting the
heterogeneity of risks within the portfolio of corporate credit.
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(4) In this sense, capital requirementsare the sum of three components: 8 per cent of the risk-weightedassets for credit risk, capital requirementsfor market
risk and capital requirements for operational risk.One of the motivations for the revision of the Basel I Accord was the insufficient risk sensitivity in the
calculation of risk-weightedassets. Since the first proposals, there was a clear intention to replace the
“one-size-fits-all” framework of the Basel I Accord with a variety of options. Hence, according to the fi-
nal version of the Basel II Accord, banks may decide between two broad methodologies to compute
the risk-weightedassets: the Standardizedapproach and the Internal Ratings-based(IRB) approach.
5
These approaches differ in two main respects. First, the Standardized approach is based on external
risk assessments produced by rating agencies while the IRB approach is based on banks’ internal
credit risk systems. Second, under the Standardized approach, risk weights are set by the Committee
as a function of the external rating and take only discrete values (very similar to Basel I). Under the In-
ternal Ratings-based approach, risk weights are obtained by applying the risk weight function defined
by the Committee, giving rise to a range of values for risk weights.
To implement the IRB approach, banks should categorize credits into broad classes of assets with dif-
ferent underlyingrisk characteristics.The classes of assets are corporate,sovereign,banks, retail and
equity. Althoughthere is a class denotedcorporate,some exposuresto firms are not classifiedhere. In
its final version, the Accord distinguishes between exposures to small and medium sized firms (which
aredefinedasfirmswithannualsaleslowerthan50millioneuros)andexposurestolargerfirms. Expo-
sures to small and medium sized firms (SMEs) are categorized either in the retail class (if the size of
the exposure is smaller than 1 million euros) or in the corporate class, while exposures to larger firms
are always categorized in the corporate class. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the regulatory
treatment of SMEs classified as corporate departs from the one applied to larger firms, according to
their level of sales.
For eachclassof assets, therisk-weightedassets for creditriskresultfrom theinternallyestimatedrisk
parameters and the risk weight functions supplied by the Committee. Regarding the risk weight func-
tion, the Accord provides two different versions: one for sovereign, corporate and bank exposures and
another one for retail exposures. For the first, this function is:

























































































































S is a function of annual sales of the firm concerned (expressed in millions of euros), M is the maturity
of the exposure (expressed in years), b is defined as    bP D P D  011852 005478
2
.. l n , N denotes
the standard normal cumulative distribution, NI denotes the inverse of the standard normal cumulative
distribution, PD is the probability of default and LGD is the loss given default. The sales adjustment,
correspondingto the third term on the R definition,appliesonlyto corporateexposures.The function S
equalsannualsalesinmillionsof eurosif annualsalesarebetween5and50millioneuros,it equals5if
annualsalesaresmallerthanorequalto5millioneurosandit equals50if annualsalesarehigherthan
or equal to 50 million euros.
Capital requirements are positively related with PD, LGD, M and R. The positive relationship of capital
requirements on M is dependenton the loss given default and on the level of sales. In fact, a change in
the maturity of the credit has a higher impact on capital requirements for higher values of S and LGD.
Notice that R is the correlation coefficient representing the degree of comovement in credit risk of all
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(5) The IRB methodology has to be validated by the national supervision authority.exposures in the portfolio. This coefficient is derived from the asymptotic risk factor model underlying
the capital requirements under Basel II. Finally, the factor 1.06 is an ad-hoc adjustment introduced in
2004 by the Basel Committee.
Capital requirements for retail exposures are:























































































Although our study concerns firms, this risk function is relevant as exposures lower than one million
euros to SMEs will be classified as retail. In this case capital requirements are not dependent on the
maturityofthecreditaswellasonthelevelofannualsales.The correlation(R),whichisnotdependent
on the level of annual sales, proves to be smaller than the one for corporate exposures.
Regarding the estimation of the risk parameters, the Committee made two approaches available: the
Foundation approach and the Advanced approach. Under the Foundation approach, banks are re-
quired to use their own estimate of the probability of default and rely on supervisory estimates for all
other risk parameters. Under the Advanced approach, banks must use their ownestimates for the PD,
the LGD, the exposure at default (EAD) and the effective maturity. These two approaches apply to all
credit classes with the exception of retail exposures. For retail exposures banks need to provide esti-
mates of all risk parameters, implying that for this type of exposures only the IRB Advanced approach
can be used.
2.2. A comparison between Basel I and Basel II capital requirements
The focus of this study is the risk weight function, since it provides the risk-weightedassets and there-
fore capital requirements.
6 In what follows we establish regions for the PD and LGD such that Basel II
capital requirements for firms’credit risk are higherthan the ones establishedunder Basel I. Moreover,
we also proceed with a comparison of the capital requirements if a given credit is considered retail or
corporate, ceteris paribus.
In order to establish regions for LGD, weconsider it to take values in the region between45 and 75 per
cent. These limits, although somewhat arbitrary, were benchmarks established by the Committee un-
der the Foundation approach, given that for senior claims on corporates, not secured by recognised
collateral, an LGD level of 45 per cent was assigned, while for subordinated claims on corporates a
level of 75 per cent for the LGD was assigned.
7
In Chart 1 we establish regions for the parameters PD and LGD such that Basel I is more demanding
than Basel II and vice versa. We consider capital requirements for exposures to firms classified under
the retail class, hereafter denoted retail for simplification, and for exposures to firms classified as cor-
porate. For the corporate class a maturity of 0.5 and a level of annual sales smaller than or equal to 5
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(6) The comparison of capital requirements under Basel I and Basel II collapses in comparing K (as defined in equations (1) and (2)) with 8 per cent. Under
Basel I, as the corporate credit used to be weighted at 100 per cent, minimum capital held is RWA x EADx
I 88 %%  . Under Basel II the risk
weighted-assetsforcreditriskaregivenbyRWA Kx x EAD
II  125 . , whereKissuppliedbytheCommittee.Therefore,underBaselII theminimumcapital
held for firms credit risk becomes RWA x Kx x EADx Kx EAD
II 81 2 58 %. %  . 666666666666 6
(7) These levels of LGD can be adjusted on the presence of eligible collateral.million euros were considered. In general, for very high (small) values of the LGD and PD capital re-
quirements under Basel II are higher (smaller) than capital requirements under Basel I. In fact, for the
values of PD and LGD in the grey area capital requirements under Basel II are higher than capital re-
quirements under Basel I, for both classes of credit. The red area identifies the values of PD and LGD
such that Basel II results in higher capital requirements for the corporate class but not for the retail
class. Finally, the blue area identifies the set of PD and LGD values such that capital requirements un-
der Basel II are smaller, for both types of classes. In conclusion it should be stressed that although a
comparison of capital requirements under Basel II and Basel I for the corporate class is highlydepend-
ent on the estimates of the relevant risk parameters, the same does not hold if credit is categorized as
retail. In fact, for values of PD and LGD presented in the literature
8 banks set capital requirements
smaller than the ones under Basel I.
As stressedabove,the classificationof exposuresas retailor corporateis crucialfor the levelof capital
requirements. Moreover, two additional features concerning this classification should be emphasized.
The first feature concerns the discontinuity in capital requirements when one exposure changes from
the retail class to the corporateclass, or vice-versa, as different risk functionsare used. This nonnegli-
gible discontinuityin the capital requirement is generallypositive and increases with the loss given de-
fault as well as the sales level of the firm and the maturity of the credit.
9 For values of the probability of
default and the loss given default reported in the literature (2 and 50 per cent, respectively),maturityof
2.5 years and sales of 5 million euros, the capital requirements can be either 5.2 per cent or 8.3 per
cent depending on the exposure being classified as retail or corporate, as illustrated on the left hand
side of Chart 2.
This example illustrates the importance of an adequate classification of exposures, as pricing deci-
sions should be closely related to capital requirements. For instance, for the same level of sales and
maturity of the exposure, a credit below the one million euros threshold has a lower capital require-
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Chart 1
COMPARING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER BASEL I  K
I AND BASEL II  K
II FOR EXPOSURES TO



















































I  , retail, corporate
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The corporate class is assumed to have a maturity of 0.5 years and annual sales smaller then or equal to 5 million euros.
(8) See, for instance, Tarashev and Zhu (2007), Fernandes (2006), Antunes (2005), Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2005), Saurina and Trucharte (2004),
Dietsch and Petey (2004).
(9) Forasmallsetofriskparametersitisconceivablethatwhenmovingfromretailclasstocorporateclasscapitalrequirementscoulddecrease,onceagainin
a discontinuous way. Further details in Antão and Lacerda (2009).ment,whichcanbepassedthroughtocostumersviamorecompetitiveloanpricingorsimplybyadding
to the profit margin of the bank. As such, certain concerns may arise about the proper operation of a
level playing field and/or undercapitalization of some banks based on its capacity to correctly classify
the exposures to non-financial firms.
The second feature concerns the different sensitivity of capital requirements to the probability of de-
fault. Among all credit classes, the retail class is the one for which capital requirements exhibit the
smallestsensitivityfor a givenchangeinthe probabilityof default,as canbeseeninthe righthandside
of Chart 2. In fact, for a wide range of values for the probability of default, a one percentage point
change in the probability of default will result in a change smaller than 0.5 percentage points in capital
requirements, for an LGD of 50 per cent.
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF LOANS TO PORTUGUESE FIRMS AND THEIR
RATES OF DEFAULT
This section presents a characterization of loans to Portuguese firms and their rates of default. It be-
gins with a characterization of loans in December 2007 followed by a description of default rates in
2008, taking a definition of default in line with the one established in the Basel II Accord.
Financial Stability Report 2008 | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Part II
7
Chart 2
































































LGD of 50 per cent are considered.
Jump in capital requirements Capital requirements
Retail
Corporate, sales  5
Basel I
Retail
Corporate, sales  5
Corporate, sales = 25
Corporate, sales  503.1. Loans to firms
The followinganalysisreliesmostlyona CreditRegisterdatasetmanagedbyBancodePortugal(Cen-
tral de Responsabilidades de Crédito). This brings together information provided by all credit institu-
tions operating in Portugal. The dataset collates monthly information on all loans granted to
non-financial corporations, as well as credit lines, with an amount outstanding higher than 50 euros.
10




11 The additional data for this work comes from the Central Balance Sheet Data-
base (Central de Balanços), providing the information on annual sales necessary to calibrate the cor-
porate function specified in equation (1). The starting point of the exercise was the credit portfolio of
firms in December 2007, stratified according to the level of annual sales for the year 2007. Annual
sales for 2006 were taken whenever the value for 2007 was missing in the database. After combining
these databases, the sample for December 2007 has around 400 000 observations ( i.e., credit expo-
sures to non-financial firms), corresponding to about 230 000 firms. In Portugal in December 2007,
201 financial institutions from more than 20 financial groups were reporting to the Credit Register. The
five major financial groups operating in Portugal grant more than 68 per cent of the total outstanding
loans to firms.
In order to characterize loans to firms, we begin by decomposing them by maturity and by credit class,
as defined in Basel II. In terms of maturity, the decomposition is performed in the followingcategories:
short-term loans, medium and long-term loans, overdue loans, unused credit lines, and other loans.
Medium and long-term loans have the largest share in the Portuguese banking system, representing
more than 50 per cent of total loans, as reported on the left hand side of Chart 3.
As for credit classes, under the IRB approach for corporate credits, banks are allowed to distinguish
betweenexposurestosmallandmediumsizefirms(SMEs)andthosetolargefirms.SMEsaredefined
here as firms with reported annual sales smaller than 50 million euros. Loans extended to SMEs can
thenbedividedintothreeclassesaccordingtotheamountofcreditgrantedandannualsales:retailex-
posure, as long as the total exposure to the banking group is smaller than 1 million euros, and two
other corporate categories, as long as the total exposure is higher than 1 million euros, for different
levels of sales. Summing up, the four classes in which the total credit is divided are as follows:
1. theSME_Retailclass,whichincludescreditssmallerthanonemillioneurostofirmswithannual
sales smaller than 50 million euros,
12
2. the SME_1 class, which includes credits higher than one million euros to firms with annual
sales smaller than 5 million euros;
3. the SME_2 class, which includes credits higher than one million euros to firms with annual
sales between 5 and 50 million euros;
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(10) Although not considered in this study, this data set also contains information on loans granted to households, public administration and non-incorporated
business, as well as information onsecuritized operations.
(11) Theshorttermloansfurtherbreakdownintocommercialliabilities,financeatdiscountandothershorttermliabilities.Inaddition,itispossibletoidentifythe
portion of overdue loans which are under litigation.
(12) There are other conditions that credits must follow to be considered as retail exposures. For instance, the retail portfolio must follow the so-called
“granularity criterion”, that is, it needs to be “sufficiently diversified to reduce risks”, which may imply the setting of limits to aggregate exposures to one
counterparty.4. and the Corporate class, which includes credits of any size to firms with annual sales higher
than 50 million euros.
According to this decomposition
13 most loans are granted to SMEs, where the retail is the most repre-
sentative class (see the right hand side of Chart 3). Loans to firms with more than 50 million euros of
annual sales account for 10 per cent of total credit to firms. If loans are categorized according only to
exposure size, it is observed that 4 per cent of the total number of exposures is higher than one million
euros, corresponding to 71 per cent of the total amount of credit. This result is in line with the fact that
the credit portfolio of the Portuguesebankingsystemis “highly concentratedon large firms”, wherethe
size of the firm is proxiedbythe size of its total credit, as discussedin several Banco de Portugal finan-
cial stability reports (e.g. Banco de Portugal (2007)).
Table 1 presents a decomposition of loans by corporate class and maturity, excluding unused credit
lines. This table also decomposes loans overdue across credit classes. As already mentioned, most
loans have a maturity higher than one year. The debt maturity pattern is the same for those loans
wherea credit class can not be allocateddue to the lack of information on annualsales, as these loans
aremainlymediumandlong-termcredit.RegardingtheobservedoverdueinDecember2007,itiscon-
centratedonfirmsforwhichitisnotpossibletoobtaininformationonsales.Inanycase,thesefirmswill
be excluded from the calculation of capital requirements, which assumes the ex-ante full coverage of
overdue loans by provisions.
Finally, a decomposition of loans by corporate class and industry is presented. The industry is not a
risk componentas definedin Basel II but there are twomain reasons to proceedwiththis characteriza-
tion. First, the concentration of the Portuguese banking system in a few economic activity sectors,
namely construction and real estate, is a persistent fact which has been reported in the Banco de Por-
tugal Financial Stability Report (e.g. Banco de Portugal (2007)) for the last few years. The concentra-
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Chart 3
DECOMPOSITION OF THE TOTAL LOANS TO FIRMS
December 2007
























Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Note: On the right panel unused credit lines are excluded.
(13) Only78.5percentoftotalloansisallocatedbycreditclassasthereisnoinformationavailableonannualsalesfortheremaining.Salesreportedasnullwere
not considered. Saurina and Trucharte (2004), where eight years of data are considered, have an average exposure coverage of 73.9 per cent.tion in the real estate sector is even more severe if mortgage loans are considered,as theyaccount for
about 45 per cent of the total loans of the Portuguese banking system to the private non-financial sec-
tors. Nevertheless,thisfact hasnotbeenconsideredaseriousvulnerabilityof thePortuguesefinancial
system, since mortgage loans tend to have lower risk, as they are secured by property and real estate
pricesinPortugalarenotbelievedtobeovervaluedastheyareinsomeotherEuropeancountries.The
second reason to proceed withthis characterization is related to the estimation of the probabilityof de-
fault of exposures (to be done in the next subsection) as, in an attempt to construct homogenous
portfolios, a segmentation per economic sector is conducted.
As expected, in December 2007, loans to firms belonging to the real estate and construction sectors
represented the major share of total loans, accounting for more than 38 per cent of total loans to firms
(see Table2). In addition,these firms are mostlyclassifiedin the SMEs classes. In fact, the SME_retail
and the SME_1 are the most important classes for almost all economic sectors. Finally, it is not possi-
ble to characterize in terms of annual sales almost half of the loans granted to firms in the “other ser-
vices providedto firms” sector, and this is, in fact, a drawbackfor our analysis,giventhat loansgranted
to firms belonging to this sector represent more than 14 per cent of total loans to firms.
Summing up, in December 2007, the majorityof firms’loans obtained through the Portuguese banking
system were characterized by having a maturity higher than one year. In addition, about 25 per cent of
loansto firms couldberecognizedas retailexposures,andmorethan38percent of totalloansto firms
were granted to firms in real estate and construction sectors.
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Table 1
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY CORPORATE CLASS AND MATURITY
As a percentage of total loans
SME_retail SME_1 SME_2 Corporate No information Total
Medium and long-term 13.4% 17.0% 13.9% 6.5% 15.2% 66.0%
Short-term 11.4% 5.6% 6.7% 3.6% 5.1% 32.4%
Overdue 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.6%
Total 25.0% 22.7% 20.7% 10.1% 21.5% 100.0%
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Note: Unused credit lines are excluded. The residual category “other” is assumed to have medium and long-term maturity.
Table 2
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY CORPORATE CLASS AND ECONOMIC SECTOR
As a percentage of total loans
SME_retail SME_1 SME_2 Corporate No information Total
Construction 4.3% 6.4% 3.6% 1.9% 3.3% 19.5%
Real estate 1.9% 6.9% 4.6% 0.7% 5.3% 19.4%
Trade 7.5% 1.2% 2.4% 1.7% 2.2% 14.9%
Other services provided to firms 1.4% 4.3% 0.8% 0.9% 7.0% 14.4%
Manufacturing 5.4% 1.0% 3.5% 1.9% 1.4% 13.2%
Other services 1.5% 0.8% 1.6% 0.9% 1.1% 5.8%
Transport 1.0% 0.4% 2.3% 1.7% 0.2% 5.6%
Other economic sectors 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 0.5% 1.2% 7.3%
No economic sector 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Note:Thecategory “Othereconomicsectors”includeseconomicsectorsrepresenting lessthan 4%ofthetotalloanstofirms;the“Noeconomicsector”referstoloanstofirmsnotpossi-
ble to characterize in terms of economic sector. Unused credit lines are excluded.3.2. The rate of default
The followingsubsection presents a characterization of the observed rate of default of the Portuguese
non-financialfirms overtheyear2008.The definitionof defaultusedis inlinewiththeoneinBaselII. In
that context, for a financial group,
14 an exposure is considered to be in default whenever the firm is
overdue more than 500 euros (loans reported either as overdue loans or loans under litigation) over
three consecutive months. For the assessment of the default rate over 2008 onlythe exposures in De-
cember 2007 that did not exhibit default over 2007 will be considered.
The heterogeneity of loans among economic sectors motivates a first characterization of the rate of
default by economic sector. The highest rate of default is observed in exposures to firms in the con-
struction sector, while the smallest in exposures to firms in agriculture and fishing. This information is
presented in Chart 4, where the horizontal axis represents the median exposure of each industry. The
area of each bubble is proportional to the number of exposures in each industry.
Apossiblerelationshipbetweentheobservedrateofdefaultandthesizeofthefirmisalsoexplored,as
the literature documents this relationship in other countries. This analysis will be performed taking an-
nual sales as proxy for the firm size. The absence of information on the economic sector and sales for
some exposures results in the exclusion of 12.3 per cent of reported exposures, corresponding to 20
percentof loans.
15 This reductioninthesamplesizecreatesabiasas, ingeneral,theobservationsnot
considered correspond to firms with higher default rate. Then, in the sample finally used, 3.6 per cent
of the number of exposures exhibited default in 2008. The proportion of the amount of loans exhibiting
default is also 3.6 per cent.
16
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Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de
Crédito).
Note: Utilities include gas, electricity, water, post and telecommunications. The default
rate corresponds to the number of exposures in a given economic sector exhibiting de-
fault in 2008 over the total number of exposures belonging to that economic sector.




those loans exhibiting default would only be 4.1 per cent of the total amount of loans.Table 3 presents a characterization of the rate of default of the financial group exposures for different
classes of firms’sales as wellas exposurelevels. The default rate corresponds to the number of expo-
suresinagivenclassexhibitingdefaultin2008overthenumberofexposuresinthesameclass.More-
over, the number of exposures over the total number of exposures as wellas the amount of loans over
total loans are also reported.
As can be observed, the rate of default decreases with the firms’sales. Hence, taking firms’sales as a
proxyfor the firms’size wecan saythat largerfirms exhibitlowerrate of defaulton their loans.This is in
line with Dietsch and Petey (2004) and Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2005), among others, who
have also reported similar evidence in different countries. In terms of the relationship between the ob-
served rate of default and the size of the exposure, for the adopted classes of exposure, the highest
default rate is observed for exposures between one and ten million euros. The smallest default rates
are observed for exposures smaller than ten thousand euros and higher than ten million euros. Credit
exposureshigherthantenmillioneuros,althoughcausedbyonly0.3percentofthetotalnumberofex-
posures, correspond to 34.1 per cent of total credit. The relationship betweenthe observed rate of de-
faultandthesizeoftheexposurestillholdsiftheoverallsampleisconsidered.Inaddition,defaultrates
would increase, confirming the bias of our sample towards better creditors and reinforcing the
importance of conducting robustness tests with the entire dataset.
In Table 4 information on the rate of default, the number of the exposures as well as the size of the ex-
posures is also reported as per the four classes of credit previously described. The adoption of this
classification, in line with Basel II, results in an asymmetric distribution of loans with a clear concentra-
tion in the SME_retail class, as alreadypresented in previous subsection. In fact, the SME_retail class
includes 95.8 per cent of the number of credit exposures and accounts for 31.7 per cent of total loans.
The highest rate of default is observed for exposures classified as SME_1. Over and against this, the
Corporateclass presents the lowestdefault rate. This class, althoughoriginatedbyonly0.8 per cent of
the number of exposures, accounts for 13.3 per cent of the total amount of loans.
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Table 3
THE DEFAULT RATE ON THE PORTUGUESE FIRMS IN 2008
By firm sales and exposure size
Banking group exposure













Default rate 2.6% 4.3% 4.6% 6.4% 6.2% 3.9%
% exposures 28.8% 44.2% 16.9% 1.9% 0.1% 91.9%
% loans 0.4% 6.2% 18.6% 17.6% 10.9% 53.8%
5-5 0
Default rate 0.4% 0.9% 1.4% 2.3% 2.2% 1.4%
% exposures 0.8% 1.4% 3.7% 1.3% 0.1% 7.4%
% loans 0.0% 0.2% 5.9% 12.7% 14.1% 33.0%
>5 0
Default rate 0.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6%
% exposures 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.8%
% loans 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 3.8% 9.1% 13.3%
Default rate 2.6% 4.1% 4.0% 4.4% 3.4% 3.6%
% exposures 29.7% 45.7% 20.8% 3.5% 0.3% 100.0%
% loans 0.4% 6.4% 25.0% 34.1% 34.1% 100.0%
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Notes:Classesdefinedinmillioneuros.Thedefaultratecorrespondstothenumberofexposuresinagivenclassexhibitingdefaultin2008overthetotalnumberofexposuresbelonging
to the same class.4. CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM
This section assesses the implications on capital requirements driven by firms’ credit risk for Portu-
guesebanks,if theIRB methodologyhadbeenadoptedin2007.Webeginbypresentingtheresults on
capital requirements for the Portuguese banking system concerning firms’ credit risk. Robustness
tests on this analysisare also performed. This is then followedbya comparison betweenthe results on
capital requirements at December 2007 and similar estimates at December 2006.
4.1. Capital requirements
The assessment of capital requirements concerning firms’credit risk is carried out using the observed
rate of default in 2008, described in the previous section, as a proxy for the probability of default. For
each class of credit and for each economic sector a different probabilityof default is assigned,
17 in line
with the fact that in 2008 the rates of default exhibit heterogeneous behavior across these two dimen-
sions. The capital requirements are then aggregated using as weights the proportion of the amount of
loans in the total portfolio.
As described in Section 2 the computation of capital requirements under Basel II involves the knowl-
edge of other risk components regarding each credit exposure, among them the maturity of the credit
and the loss given default (see equations (1) and (2)). In terms of credit maturity, a maturity of half a
year for the short term and a maturity of two years and a half for the long term is used. At a later stage,
simulationswithdifferentmaturitiesarealsoperformed.
18 In referenceto the lossgivendefault,wefirst
take as benchmark the values 45 and 75 per cent, as discussed in Section 2. These bounds for the
LGD are in line with the results of Fernandes (2006), where data from a Portuguese commercial bank
gives an average recovery rate of 48.6 per cent. In turn, using data over the period 1995-2000 from a
differentPortuguesecommercialbank,DermineandNetodeCarvalho(2006)concludedthemeancu-
mulative recovery rate to be 71 per cent. Additionally, using a more comprehensive data set, covering
credit information reported by Portuguese financial institutions over the period between 1995 and
2001,Antunes(2005)concludesthat a roughestimateof the LGD wouldbe46percent. Finally, the re-
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Table 4
THE DEFAULT RATE ON THE PORTUGUESE FIRMS IN 2008
By credit class
SME_retail SME_1 SME_2 Corporate
Exposure <1 >1 >1
Sales < 50 < 5 5 - 50 > 50
Default rate 3.6% 6.5% 2.3% 0.6%
% exposures 95.8% 2.0% 1.4% 0.8%
% loans 31.7% 28.3% 26.7% 13.3%
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Note: Classesdefined inmillioneuros.Thedefault ratecorresponds tothenumberofexposuresinagivenclassexhibitingdefault in2008overthetotalnumberofexposuresbelonging
to the same class.
(17) Forsomeeconomicactivitysectorsandsomeclassesofcredittheobserveddefaultratein2008is0percent.Inthesecases,andfollowingBaselII,wetake
the probability of default to be 0.03 per cent.
(18) The simulated values for the long-term maturity are restricted as Basel II defines the maximum maturity to be 5 years.sults of the fifth quantitative impact study (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006a)) show
that LGDs in the corporate portfolio range between29.1 per cent and 56.3 per cent (the average being
39.8 per cent), while for the SME corporate portfolio, the average LGD for G10 largest banks is 35.0
percent, but valuesrangefrom 16.3percent to 54.5percent. Giventhe previouslymentionedstudies,
the Basel II Accord benchmarks and the absence of information on risk mitigation, several simulations
for different values of LGD were carried out.
The characterization of capital requirements for the Portuguese banking system begins by analysing
the heterogeneity across financial groups operating in Portugal. Capital requirements for each finan-
cial group are computed as a weighted average of the capital requirement of each credit exposure,
where the weights are the ratio of each EAD over the total EAD in the financial group. The EAD in-
cludes short-term loans, medium and long-term loans as well as loans labelled as other. As a conser-
vative scenario, these other loans, where there is no information on maturity, were considered as
long-term. Note that capital requirements of each exposure depends on the amount of the exposure,
maturity, annual sales, and economic sector. The influence of the economic sector on capital require-
ments results from the fact that the PD, which is an input of the risk weight function, may be different
across economic sectors.
This analysisis carriedout usingempiricaldistributionsobtainedbyrecourseto a Gaussiankernelthat
weights financial groups by their total loans to firms, with results being reported in Chart 5. This analy-
sis is performed for different values of LGD and maturity of exposures. For the LGD, the values 45 and
75 per cent wereconsidered.For maturitythree different scenarioswereused: a short-term maturityof
0.2 years and a long-term maturity of 1.5 years; a short-term maturity of 0.5 years and a long-term ma-
turity of 2.5 years; and a short-term maturity of 0.8 years and a long-term maturity of 4.5 years. As ex-
pected, capital requirements increase with the LGD and the effective maturity of the exposures. The
LGD assumption proves to be crucial to the determination of capital requirements. For an LGD of 45
per cent, capital requirements for firms’ credit risk are lower than 8 per cent for most institutions while
the opposite happens for an LGD of 75 per cent. It is observed that the heterogeneityacross banks in-
creases with the LGD value and with the maturity of exposures. As LGD increases, capital require-
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Chart 5
EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DIFFERENT MATURITIES OF THE
EXPOSURES AND LOSS GIVEN DEFAULT
Across financial groups
2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
Capital requirements
LGD 0.45 
MM st lt  02 15 .; .
MM st lt  05 25 .; .
MM st lt  08 45 .; .
LGD 0.75 
MM st lt  02 15 .; .
MM st lt  05 25 .; .
MM st lt  08 45 .; .
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Note: This is an empirical distribution obtained through recourse to a Gaussian kernel that weights institutions by loans to firms.ments exhibit higher dispersion as they are more sensitive to the composition of each financial group’s
loans across credit classes. An analogous conclusion can be made concerning the average
maturities.
We now proceed with the analysis of capital requirements for the Portuguese banking system, weighting
each financial group by its total amount of loans to non financial firms. The analysis is carried out by de-
composing total loans into the credit classes previously defined and according to the maturity of expo-
sures. Results show that capital requirements driven by firms’ credit risk for the banking system will be
lower than the ones under Basel I as long as the LGD is assumed to be lower than 52 per cent (see Chart
6). The Corporate and SME_retail classes are those that have a smaller capital requirement, for anylevel
of LGD. In the case of the SME_retail class, although it presents a high probability of default, the func-
tional form of the risk weight function induces this result. In the Corporate case, although the functional
form of the risk weight function would lead to the highest capital requirements among different classes
(everything else the same), its lowest probability of default induces the result. On the subject of expo-
sures to SMEs, it should be stressed that capital requirements for exposures higher than 1 million euros
and sales smaller than 5 million are above those of the overall banking system, while capital require-
ments for the other two SME classes are below. Capital requirements of the SME_2 class are below the
ones for the SME_1 because the probability of default is much lower, although the risk weight function is
more demanding. In a comparison of the SME_1 class with the SME_retail class, the fact that capital re-
quirements are smaller for the retail results from the fact that the risk weight function is less demanding
and the probabilityof default is lower. This corroborates the results presented in Section 2 concerning the
importance of an exposure classification. In short, if the probabilities of default were the same for all
classes, capital requirements for firms classified as Corporate would be higher than those for the SME_2,
whichinturnwouldbehigher thanthosefor SME_1. TheSME_retailclass wouldresult inthelowest capi-
tal requirements. However, as presented in Chart 6, this is not observed because of the heterogeneous
probabilities of default. In particular, the probability of default of the Corporate class is so much smaller
than the SME_retail one that capital requirements turn out to be similar. Chart 6 also illustrates the fact
that errors due to incorrect classification increase with higher levels of LGD. In terms of the decomposi-
tion of capital requirements according to the maturity of exposure, which is not a relevant risk driver for
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Chart 6
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM






































































Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Note: The maturity of short-term loans was assumed to be 0.5 years while the maturity of long-term loans was assumed to be 2.5 yearscapital requirements of retail exposures, longer-term maturities result in higher capital requirements, as
expected (right panel of Chart 6).
4.2. Robustness analysis
As a robustness test of the Portuguese banking system capital requirements for firms’ credit risk, we
assess the implications of the postulated maturities of the exposures, the exclusion of the exposures
for which there is no available information on annual sales and the use of different probabilities of de-
fault. Hence, the first robustness check concerns the maturity of exposures. If the short-term maturity
is assumed to be 0.2 years and the long-term maturity is assumed to be 1.5 years, a recovery rate
higher than 44 per cent assures that capital requirements under Basel II are lower than those under
BaselI(seeleftpanelofChart7).Ontheotherhand,assumingashort-termmaturityof0.8yearsanda
long-term maturity of 4.5 years, capital requirements under Basel II are lowerthan those under Basel I
if the recoveryrate is higher than 53 per cent. As previouslymentioned, this value for the recoveryrate
is in line with previous studies on Portuguese banks.
The second robustness check concerns the bias of the sample towards better creditors, which is a
drawbackof the previousanalysis.In this context, the exposureswithno informationavailableweredi-
vided into twogroups, as a function of exposuresize. The exposuressmaller than 1 million euros were
classifiedas SME_retail
19 (around3 per cent of total loans),whileallthe otherswereclassifiedas Cor-
porate (around 17 per cent of total loans), the most conservative scenario for exposures higher than 1
million euros. The probability of default assigned to these exposures was, once again, the observed
rate of default over 2008. For exposures smaller than 1 million euros, the observed rate of default is
13.6 per cent. For exposures higher than 1 million euros the observed rate is 9.7 per cent, which is
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Chart 7
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Source: Banco de Portugal (Central de Balanços and Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito).
Notes:For the right panel, the maturity of short-term loans was assumed to be 0.5 years while the maturity of long-term loans was assumed to be 2.5 years.
M st  08 .
M st  05 .
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(19) This classification is not the most conservative as firms with sales higher than 50 million euros may have exposures lower than 1 million euros. In such
cases,exposureslowerthan1millioneuroswouldbewronglycategorizedasSME_retail.However,thissituationwasnotcontemplatedasforfirmsthatdid
notexhibitdefaultover2007andwithinformationavailableonsalesfortheyear2007,only1.3percentoftheloanslowerthan1million euroswascaused
by firms with sales higher than 50 million. Hence, given the impossibility of classifying as SME_retail or Corporate the exposures smaller than 1 million
euros, the classification of the whole group as Corporate would lead to a less precise evaluation of capital requirements.much higher than the rate observed for exposures initially classified as Corporate. In this scenario,
capitalrequirements for firms’creditriskinthebankingsystemremainbelowthoseunderBaselI onlyif
therecoveryrateisassumedtobearoundorhigherthan60percent(seerightpanelofChart7).More-
over, the consideration of these exposures causes a higher sensitivity of capital requirements with
respect to the LGD.
The third robustness check concerns the use of different probabilities of default, namely the consider-
ation of a single probability of default for the wholesystem and a single probability of default per differ-
ent homogeneous groups of exposures. The reason underlying this robustness test is the potential
error of grouping heterogeneousexposuresand assigning them the same probabilityof default, as the
risk weightfunctions are concave (see right-hand-sideof Chart 2) on the probabilityof default.
20 In this
context, we first considered a single probability of default of 3.6 per cent (as pointed out in subsection
3.2). Results show that capital requirements for firms’ credit risk would exhibit an increase of 1.1 per-
centage points when compared with the baseline case presented in subsection 4.1 for an LGD of 50
per cent. Then, we considered single probabilities of default for the following homogeneous groups: i)
economic sector and exposure size; ii) sales level and exposure size and iii) economic sector. The ex-
posure size classes, as well as the level of sales classes, are as defined in (Table 3). Comparing with
the baseline case presented in subsection 4.1, the highest difference in capital requirements is ob-
served if default rates are uniform for exposuresin the same economic sector. An increase of 1.33 p.p.
in the level of capital requirements is observedif an LGD of 50 per cent is considered.The use of a sin-
gle rate of default per sales level and exposure size results in the lowest change of around 0.7 p.p. in
capital requirements (for an LGD of 50 per cent). These results stress the importance of stratifying ad-
equately the portfolio of loans to non-financial firms into homogeneous groups for the purpose of com-
puting capital requirements.
4.3. Time-consistency of capital requirements
Using the same approach, capital requirements driven by firms’credit risk for the Portuguese banking
system were also computed for December 2006, in which case the observed rate of default in 2007
was used as a proxy for the probability of default. The comparison of capital requirements for two con-
secutive years allows a decomposition of its change into two important components, namely, changes
in the composition of the credit portfolio and changes in the probability of default. In our data, it is ob-
served a relevant increase in default rates, especially in the exposures classified as SME_1, resulting
in an increaseof 0.26 p.p. in capital requirements for an LGD of 50 per cent. This increasecan go up to
0.4 p.p. if an LGD of 75 per cent is considered.
21 Most of this increase in capital requirements (around
85percent)isduetoanincreaseintheprobabilityofdefaultin2008.This effect resultsfromassessing
capital requirements for 2006 using, as proxy for the probability of default, the default rate in 2008,
which reflects the less favorable macro-economic setting. The remaining effect (around 15 per cent)
can be justified by changes in the portfolio structure.
Financial Stability Report 2008 | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Part II
17
(20) Further details in Antão and Lacerda (2009).
(21) The proportion of firms with no available information on annual sales, and hence not considered here, is higher in 2007 than in 2006. Consequently, this
increase is underestimated once these firms present higher probabilities of default.5. CONCLUSIONS
The Basel II Accord, which came into force in 2007, establishes new capital adequacy rules. In con-
trast to the previous Accord, this new one seeks a better alignment between regulatory capital and
economic risk. One of the most important changes is the definition of capital requirements for credit
risk based on internal risk ratings. Banks are permitted to develop internal methodologies to quantify
the creditworthinessof their creditors. These methodologieswillallowfor the computation of twoof the
most important risk components needed for the computation of risk-weightedassets: the probabilityof
default and the loss given default. Then, for each credit portfolio, and using some additional informa-
tion, a risk weight function provided by the Basel Committee translates these risk components into
capital requirements.
This work aims at studying the impact of the adoption of Basel II rules for the determination of capital
requirements for firms’credit risk. It starts byestablishingregionsof valuesfor the probabilityof default
andthe loss givendefaultfor whichBaselII wouldbemore demandingin terms of capital requirements
forfirms’creditriskthanBaselI. Weconcludethatcapitalrequirementsforexposuresclassifiedascor-
porate being higher or lower than the ones under Basel I is dependent on the values assumed for the
PD and the LGD. On the other hand, for credit to firms classified as retail, and for commonly accepted
values for PD and LGD, capital requirements are belowthose under Basel I. Our analysisemphasizes
the importance of an exposure’s classification as retail or corporate.
In Portugal, as expected, most loans are granted to firms with annual sales smaller than 50 million eu-
ros (SMEs), from which less than half are classified as retail exposures. The real estate and construc-
tion sectors are the economic sectors where loans are more concentrated. The majority of the loans
haveamaturityhigherthanoneyear. The observedfirms’rateof defaultinPortugalovertheyear2008
presents a differentiated pattern across different economic sectors. Construction comes in with the
highest default rate. Moreover, the observed rate of default decreases with the firms’ size, taking the
definition of firm size as in the Accord. For the adopted categories of exposure size, the observed rate
of default is non monotonic, increasing (roughly) with the exposure size for exposures smaller than 10
millioneuros (whichaccount for 66 per cent of total loans) and decreasingsignificantlyfor those higher
than that amount (which account for 0.3 per cent of the number of exposures and 34 per cent of total
loans).
Using the observed rate of default in 2008 as a proxyfor the probabilityof default in 2007, assessed by
economic sector and class of credit as defined in Basel II, capital requirements for the Portuguese
bankingsystemassociatedwithloansto non-financialfirms areshownto belowerthanthe onesunder
Basel I, for recoveryrates higher than 50 per cent. Among the SMEs, the retail class is the one that ex-
hibits the lowest capital requirements, despite having a high rate of default. The Corporate class dis-
plays very similar capital requirements to the SME_retail class, whichcan be justified by the fact that it
exhibits the smallest rate of default. The empiricalanalysisfor Portuguesenon-financialfirms confirms
the importance of the allocation of credits among the credit classes defined under Basel II. As there is
no precise information available for the maturity of exposures, different assumptions were made. Un-
derextremeassumptionsformaturityifarecoveryrateof53percentisassumed,capitalrequirements
for firms’credit risk are still lowerthanthoseunderBaselI. In addition,giventhe non-existenceof infor-
mation on annual sales for all exposures, a robustness check on the inclusion of these observations
was carried out. Assuming standard values for maturity and a recovery rate of 50 per cent, capital re-
quirements for firms’credit risk will still be smaller than those under Basel I. Using a different segmen-
tation for the estimation of the probabilityof default, an increase in capital requirements wasobserved.
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der Basel I. Finally, comparing capital requirements for 2006 and 2007, an increase wasobtained. The
main reason for this change was an increase in the probability of default, reflecting the recent
deterioration of firms’ credit risk.
It should be stressed that our analysis only considers the credit risk of non-financial corporations’
loans, leavingaside the remainingloan portfolio, among whichare mortgage loans. Market and opera-
tional risk are not assessed at all in this study. The treatment of mortgage loans is of extreme impor-
tance for the assessment of capital requirements in the Portuguese banking system, as mortgage
loans represent around half of the total credit granted by banks. We believe that the inclusion of mort-
gage loans would result in lower capital requirements, given that these credits have collateral (result-
ing in lower LGD) and are classified as retail. On the other hand, the capital charge for operational risk
would add up a non-negligible amount to capital requirements presented in this work.
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